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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is vested in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 78-
2a-3(2)(h) of Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is the trial court ruling that no significant unexpected change of circumstances had 
occurred which required continuation of the payment of alimony by Appellee to 
Appellant in error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
""The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been 
a substantial change of circumstances ... is presumed valid...'" and we 
review the ruling under an abuse of discretion and standard. Moon v. 
Moon, 1999 UT App. 121f 28, 973 P.2d 431 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999)." 
Bolligerv.Bolliger. 2000 UT App. 47, Tf 10, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal were preserved as they were presented in 
Appellant's trial brief (R.279-270), Appellee's trial brief (R. 287-280) and were the issues 
ruled upon by the trial court (R. 294-288). Initially, these issues were presented in 
Appellant's Petition to continue alimony (R. 89-90), Appellee's Motion to Dismiss (R. 
146-148), Appellant's Amended Petition to Continue Alimony (R. 165-166) and the 
Answer to the Amended Petition (R. 169-171). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are two potential views of this case. The Decree itself provides that the 
Appellant had a right to petition to extend alimony: 
"...based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties." 
(R.82). 
The statute governing alimony [§ 30-3-5 of the Utah Code] in effect when this 
decree was entered has been amended several times since the entry of the Decree. 
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i)-(ii) of the Utah Code was in effect when this matter was decided 
by the trial court provides: 
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial.material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony 
to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the 
decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court found each of the factors the Appellant asserted constituted a 
significant change of circumstances were to be true; (R. 291-290) however, ruled they 
did not constitute a significant change in circumstances justifying the continuation of 
alimony (R. 290). Appellant requests this Court to correct that error. 
The trial court faced and resolved two questions in rendering this decision. The 
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first was whether to apply the law of the case as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce 
that a change of circumstances justifying the continuation of the alimony alone was 
sufficient to continue alimony. State v. Jacobv. 1999 UT App 52, If 10, 975 P.2d 939, 
942; and Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 442, (Utah App 1998). After resolving this 
question against Appellant, the Court ruled she would be required to meet the current 
statutory and case law test of showing a material change of circumstances had occurred 
since entry of the decree not contemplated in the decree itself, Bolliger v. Bolliger. Id. at 
f s 11, 12, & 13. (Quoting Durfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 713, (Utah. App. 1990). 
The final ruling of the trial court was that all events alleged by Appellant were 
proven by her but they did not constitute a material change in circumstances. (R. 290). 
The actual test utilized is only important if this Court finds that decision to be an abuse of 
discretion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time the parties were divorced, they entered into a Stipulation (R. 38-14) 
which was entered into the Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation provided 
for alimony (R. 34-33). It stated in relevant part: 
"Appellee would pay to the Appellant as alimony $7,917.00 per month 
as alimony until the Appellee reached the age of sixty-five (65) unless 
Appellant filed a Petition to Extend Alimony based upon a material change 
in the financial circumstances of the parties." 
(R34-33). This language tracked through and became part of the Decree of Divorce (R. 
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82-83). On May 3, 1999, prior to Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th) birthday, Appellant filed a 
Petition requesting the court to continue alimony (R. 90-89). 
The issue of what law was applicable to govern this Petition was raised 
immediately by Appellee in a Motion to Dismiss (R. 148-146). Appellant responded by 
asserting that the law of the case governed (R. 162-158). The trial court, after hearing 
argument on what was the applicable law, directed the filing of an amended petition (R. 
173-172). Appellant complied with the Court's direction. (R. 166-164). The issue that 
came before the Court for trial was whether or not there had been a substantial-change of 
circumstances not anticipated at the time of the entry of the Decree which required the 
court to order the continuation of alimony. 
The Appellant asserted there had been five changes in circumstances which 
required the continuation of alimony: 
1. The Appellant received nothing for her interest in Collusion Safety 
Engineering and less than 53% of the value of the assets awarded to her 
while the Appellee has received a minimum of $ 150,000.00; 
2. Appellant opened an art gallery from which she expected to support herself 
but it failed; 
3. Appellant did not develop a significant ability to earn income during the 
marriage and while that was known at the time of the entry of the decree, 
what was not known was that she would not be able to earn anything above 
reasonable seasonal minimum wage if the art gallery failed; 
4. Appellant was not able to support herself from the proceeds from the art 
gallery which she thought she could; 
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5. Appellee did not retire but is in fact earning the same or more income than 
he earned at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 90-89, 166-164). The evidence established that each of the five (5) alleged changes in 
circumstance had occurred (R. 291-290), yet the trial court found this insufficient to 
justify amending the Decree to continue alimony (R. 290). 
When the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the parties had been 
married for thirty-four (34) years. (Tr.13)1. Appellant did not desire the divorce, but it 
occurred (Tr.13). The Appellant worked to support the Appellee and their family while 
the Appellant obtained his education: first a bachelor's degree, then a masters degree in 
mechanical engineering, followed by a Ph. D. (Tr.13 & 14). Appellant earned a high 
school education (R. 14). She did not pursue further education because the parties agreed 
that she was to stay at home with the children once they were bom (Tr. 14). While 
Appellant did take some college classes, she was not able to attend school not only 
because of the agreement but because the parties did not have the money to pay for child 
care in order for her to pursue an education. (Tr.14). 
Prior to the divorce, the parties had discussed the Appellant's opening an art 
gallery in Springdale Utah (Tr.14.). She did open that gallery intending to support herself 
with the gallery after the Divorce and put away some funds for retirement (Tr. 14, 40). 
1
 The full transcript is contained within the record reference 313. Consequently, 
Appellant will simply refer to transcript pages as all referenced would otherwise refer back to (R. 
313) which would not be of great assistance to the Court. 
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Unfortunately, this business failed (Tr.14-15). Consequently, the business which the 
Appellant thought she could operate to support herself after the Decree failed and she was 
not able to produce income to support herself (Tr. 33). 
The Decree of Divorce provided that certain assets were to be awarded to the 
Appellant specifically including: 
"Collision Safety Engineering $281,712.00." (R. 65). 
Appellant did not receive cash in this sum (Tr.15). She did receive stock but she cannot 
sell it, has received no dividends from it and it has no value to her (Tr.16). On the other 
hand, Appellee received at least $150,000.00 for his stock as a result of a corporate 
reorganization (Tr. 59). 
Appellant received an asset entitled CAP Development which was valued at 
$65,000.00 (Tr.16). She did not receive $65,000.00 from CAP Development. She has 
received enough in dividends to pay the taxes that are due because of undistributed 
earnings from CAP Development (which is now known as Incline) (Tr.17). Appellant is 
not involved with the management of Incline and has no ability to sell her interest in that 
entity unless her children were to purchase the stock as they manage Incline (Tr.17-18). 
Appellant has never received anything from Incline except enough money to pay taxes 
due on imputed income (Tr. 18). 
The assets received by the Appellant were summarized on Exhibit Three (3). The 
home in Springdale, Utah, and the retirement accounts were all that she received of any 
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substance. Appellant received nothing of value to her for 48% of the assets awarded to 
her (Tr. 29 - 30). The sum of these events, that is the failure to receive funds from the 
assets and the failure of the business, has left Appellant unable to support herself as she 
has no source of income except alimony (Tr. 33). 
Appellant underwent a vocational assessment to determine what she was capable 
of earning. By Stipulation, the report of Pat Arttus-Doherty was received into evidence as 
Exhibit " 1 " (Tr. 4). Ms. Doherty advised the Court that the Appellant could earn 
approximately $5.50 each hour which would produce $11,440.00 gross income per year. 
Ms. Arttus-Doherty advised the Court that Appellant was qualified for only clerical work 
because of physical and educational limitations which Appellant verified (Ex. 1, Tr.20-
22). 
After the art gallery failed, Appellant did not go to work because the income that 
she could earn would be between $6.00-$8.00 an hour on a seasonal basis and she felt she 
could be taking a job from someone who had no income which Appellant did not believe 
would be fair (Tr.20-21). 
Appellant has loaned some of these funds to her son. She expected to be re-paid 
(Tr.26-27). Unfortunately, those funds are not earning any money in the form of interest 
on capital depreciation while loaned to her son (Tr.27). When re-paid she will put the 
funds back into the American Express Retirement Account (Tr.27-28). 
All of the funds available to the Appellant, if brought together and invested, would 
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be valued at a little over $300,000.00 (Tr.29). This assumes no value for Collision Safety 
Engineering and Incline (Tr.29-30). 
The Appellant believed that her living expenses were still the same now as at the 
time of the Divorce (Tr.42). As her funds invested cannot produce enough income to 
support her and using them for her support will quickly exhaust them, Appellant is in 
need of the alimony being continued, Exhibit "5" (Tr.30-34) as she had no income but the 
alimony (Tr. 33). 
The Appellant testified on cross-examination that she did some work for Collision 
Safety Engineering prior to the divorce but that terminated with the divorce and the job 
appeared to be one that was created for her (Tr.37-39). The Appellant did want to be 
employed at the time of the divorce to run the art gallery (Tr.39) but not after it failed (Tr. 
41-42). 
Appellant testified she had no present intention to be employed unless she had to 
because her application experience has led to her being advised that because of her age, 
employers would only be interested in employing her on a part-time, seasonal basis 
(Tr.40-41). 
There has been no real change in the circumstances of Appellee. He continues on 
the adjunct faculty at Brigham Young University (Tr.50) and while his interest and the 
interest of some other members of family in Collusion Safety Engineering have been 
purchased, he continues to work at the same business (Tr.52-55). Appellee received 
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approximately $150,000.00 for his interest in Collusion Safety Engineering (Tr.59) while 
Appellant received nothing from the sale of those assets (Tr.60). The income of the 
Appellee in 1998 was $401,000.00 (Tr.60). 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED A CONTINUATION 
OF HER ALIMONY 
The trial court determined the factual assertions made by the Appellant were all 
correct yet did not constitute a change in circumstances; thus she was not entitled to 
continuation of her alimony. That error must be reversed by this Court. In evaluating 
Appellant's assertions this Court first should determine whether the test that the Appellant 
was required to meet in her Petition to Continue Alimony was that stated in the Decree of 
Divorce: 
...based on a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties, (R. 82) 
or the present statutory test of §30-3-5(7)(g)(l) and (2) of the Utah Code. 
It is Appellant's position that the law of the case as contained within the Decree of 
Divorce should have governed all that was necessary for her to establish to continue her 
alimony was that there be a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties 
so long as she petitioned the Court before the Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th) birthday. 
There is no disagreement that she filed before Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th) 
birthday. The findings of the trial court that: 
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1. The Appellant received nothing but stock which has no value to her for 
interest in Collusion Safety Engineering while Appellee has received at 
least $150,000.00; 
2. The art gallery which she intended to operate and support herself at the time 
of the Decree has failed; 
3. She developed no significant ability to earn any income during the 
marriage; and 
4. Appellee has not only not retired but is continuing to earn substantial 
income constitute a material change in financial circumstances justifying 
continuation of the alimony. 
To apply a different criteria from those enunciated in the Decree would be 
analogous to applying a statute that changes substantive rights of the parties. This would 
be unconstitutional. As noted by this Court in State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App. 52, f 10, 
975 P.2d. 939 and stated fully by this Court in Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 
1998): 
Moreover statutory enactments which "effect substantive or vested rights 
generally operate only prospectively." Department of Soc. Serv. v. Higgs, 
656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); see generally Barron's Law Dictionary, 
381 (3d ed. 1991) (defining "prospective" as law applicable only after date 
it was enacted or decided). However, if a statutory amendment is deemed 
procedural or remedial, then it applies to all actions - those which have 
accrued or are pending (pending from time of commencement until final 
determination), and to future actions. See Moore v. American Coal Co., 
737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987); Higgs, 656 P.2d 1001. In other words, a 
statute may be applied retroactively "if it affects only procedure and not 
substantive rights." Washington National Insurance Company v. 
Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)." 
Wilde. 969 P.2d at 442 (1998). After this relocation, the Wilde. Court then 
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went on to state: 
A substantive law "creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties which may give rise to a cause of action." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. 
Co,, 956 P. 2d 257, 260. (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). When the legislature 
amends a statute, we presume that it intends the amendment "to change existing 
legal rights." Id., or "simply clarify[s] the legislature's previous intentions." 
Washington Nat'l 795 P.2d 669. Procedural statutes do not "enlarge, eliminate, 
or destroy vested or contractual rights." Moore, 737 P.2d at 990 (citations 
omitted). Moreover, a court should narrowly draw [] the boundaries of what 
constitutes a procedural statute. Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261." 
969P.2dat442." 
The language of the Decree of Divorce provides: 
"...if defendant has not remarried and has not filed a petition to extend alimony 
based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties." 
This states the test for continuation of alimony that should have been applied by the trial 
court. It is less stringent than that articulated in Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 797 (Utah 
1985), the then existing law as of the date of entry of the Decree and the present statutory 
standard of § 30-3-5(7)(g)(l) and (2). Under Naylor, Appellant would have had to have 
alleged and proven that the change in circumstances was not only material but was not 
anticipated at the time of the entry of the Decree: 
"On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for 
relief is a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the 
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the Decree itself." 
Naylor. 700 P.2d at 710. This is more strict than the language of the Decree but less 
stringent than the test that now exists. 
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Application of the standard stated in the Decree clearly required alimony to be 
continued where the facts were that the art gallery failed, Appellee did not only not retire 
but was earning more income than at the time of the entry of the Decree and Appellant 
receiving nothing for 48% of the assets purportedly awarded to her while Appellee has 
received substantial funds from his equivalent portion of those assets and remained 
employed. Appellant is not able to support herself because of the failure of her business 
and Appellee has not retired nor suffered any substantial reduction in income; this alone 
should have required the trial court to continue the alimony award. 
If, however, this Court determines that it should apply the criteria of the present 
statute, the most recent statement by this Court of the applicable criteria is contained in 
Bolliger, where, this Court declared: 
To succeed on a Petition to Modify a Divorce Decree, the moving party must first 
show that a substantial, material change of circumstances has occurred"" since 
entry of the Decree and not contemplated in the Decree itself." 
Id at TI11. 
Also in Bolliger. this Court articulated what is meant by "contemplated by the 
Divorce Decree": 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial change 
of circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does not 
mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a 
material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce 
decree there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision 
within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific 
change. 
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Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716. Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record 
are bereft of any reference to the changed circumstances at issue in the Petition to 
Modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the 
original divorce decree. 
See Bolliger. id. at Tf 13. Appellant believes that the facts she established required the 
Court to continue her alimony but the trial court abused its discretion and rejected her 
continuation. 
In Bolliger. this Court reviewed the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Haslam v. Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), and its prior decisions of Munns v. Munns, 
790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990) and Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993). 
Id. at ^ f's 14-19. The opinion observed from those decisions that events at retirement can 
constitute a material change of circumstances. This is true if income changes, Bolliger, 
supra, and Haslam. supra, or if it was improperly anticipated Munns. supra, or was not 
properly considered Johnson, supra. That rationale applies to the instant matter where the 
Appellee anticipated his income declining but it has remained the same and possibly even 
increased while the Appellant did not receive everything she was expected to receive and 
the business with which she anticipated supporting herself failed. These events are 
clearly a material change of circumstances not anticipated at the time of the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
This fact patterns as Appellant pointed out to the trial court, is similar to Naylor v. 
Naylor. 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) where Mrs. Naylor was not able to earn what she 
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thought she would earn and Dr. Naylor was successful by practicing his profession. 
Under those facts, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an increase and continuation of 
alimony. This analysis was rejected by the trial court even though it noted that in Naylor. 
the Utah Supreme Court found those were appropriate circumstances in which to continue 
alimony (Tr. 293-289). 
In Bolliger. this Court in discussing the authority of its prior decision in Munns. v. 
Munns. supra, noted that it had reversed a decision automatically terminating alimony on 
the receipt of social security (Id- If's 17 & 18) and Johnson v. Johnson, supra, where the 
failure to consider retirement income was an error. (Id. ^ 19). In conjunction with the 
examination of the Haslam decision (Id. f's 14 -16), it is clear that there must be a 
reexamination of financial circumstances at retirement. The trial court erroneously 
rejected the criteria set by the parties in their Decree for that reexamination. Whether this 
Court agrees with this assertion or with the trial court's application of the present statute, 
the trial court's determination that no change occurred justifying continuation of the 
alimony is clearly erroneous. Appellee did not retire and still earns substantial income. 
On the other hand, Appellant was unable to earn the income she had anticipated and did 
not receive all assets contemplated within the Decree. 
The trial court recognized in its ruling that the Appellant asserted five (5) changes 
of circumstances had occurred which required the Court to continue her alimony: 
1. That as part of her property settlement agreement she received stock 
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for her interest in Collision Safety Engineering, a company her 
husband started, and that parts of the original company had been sold 
off. 
2. That after the divorce she opened an art gallery but the gallery failed 
shortly thereafter. 
3. That she did not develop a significant ability to earn income during 
the marriage. 
4. That she thought she could support herself with the proceeds from 
the art gallery and the property she received in the divorce 
settlement, but now these proceeds are insufficient. 
5. That the Petitioner has not retired and is earning substantially the 
same income that he earned at the time of the divorce. 
(R. 291-290). 
The court found all of these were established as true from the evidence presented by 
Appellant but ruled that these did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances 
justifying a continuation of alimony (R. 291-290). The court ruled this was true whether it 
used a test of a change in circumstances not foreseen at the time of the divorce as required 
by the statute or by the terms of the decree (R. 290). That error is clear under the 
authorities examined by this Court and the decision itself in Bolliger. Based on that 
authority, this Court must reverse the trial court and order continuation of Respondent's 
alimony. 
As Appellant's testimony was clear that her need was the same as existed at the 
time of the entry of the Decree (Tr. 42, Exhibit 5), her alimony should have been 
Page 16 
continued at the existing rate until the death of either of the parties or further order of the 
Court. Bolliger. 200 Utah App. 47, ^  23. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court, order the continuation of alimony of the 
Appellant at the level at which it had been paid since entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
This Court should award the Appellant the attorney's fees that she incurred in 
bringing this matter before this Court and remand for determination of the appropriate 
attorney's fees that should have been awarded to her for trial, as they were denied by the 
trial court based on her lack of success on the merits. 
DATED this day of May, 2000. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C, 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and that on the *" day of May, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Snow, Christensen& Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Judge's Memorandum Decision 
F:\Angie\DSD\MARY\WARNER\AppeaI\brief.wpd 
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MLLU 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH / O - ^ f e - ^ s ^ . Dupiity 
^ 
CHARLES YOUNG WARNER, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
PATSY EVELYN WARNER, 
Defendant / Respondent. 
RULING 
Case No. CV 88-367 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Petition to Continue Alimony. The 
Court has reviewed and considered the file, the parties' memoranda, and the evidence adduced both 
through testimony and through exhibits offered and received at trial, and now being fully advised in 
the premises hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
The parties' Divorce Decree was entered into by stipulation in which the parties agreed that 
alimony would terminate when the Plaintiff reached age 65, unless the Respondent "filed a petition to 
extend alimony based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties." The 
Respondent filed her Petition to Extend Alimony on May 3, 1999, and the Court held a hearing on 
the Petition on October 6, 1999. 
This Court must first decide whether the Utah Code or the parties' Divorce Decree provides 
the standard that this Court must apply in considering a modification of the alimony award. Wile the 
parties' Decree states that alimony may be modified "based upon a material change in the financial 
circumstances of the parties," the statute provides a different standard. It states: 
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i)-(ii). Therefore, the issue is whether under contract theory the 
Court is bound by the parties' stipulation regarding the standard for modifying alimony, or whether, 
under its equitable powers, the Court should disregard the parties' stipulation and apply the statutory 
standard. 
After carefully considering the statutory and case law on this issue the Court finds that it is 
not bound by the parties' stipulation, but should apply the statutory standard. A court is not bound 
by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony, child custody, or child support. Utah law mandates 
that courts have continuing, equitable discretion to modify awards of alimony, id, and child support 
or custody, id at § 30-3-5(3). Utah courts have interpreted these statutes to provide that a court is 
not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony, child support or child custody because a 
court has equitable power to modify these awards. The Utah Supreme Court announced this 
principle as early as 1953 when it stated: 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was intended to give courts power to 
disregard the stipulations or agreements of the parties in the first instance and enter 
judgment for such alimony or child support as appears reasonable and to thereafter 
modify such judgments when change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of 
attempts of the parties to control the matter by contract. Under the authorities herein 
cited such a view seems to be generally if not universally adhered to by the courts. 
Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944, 948-49 (Utah 1953). 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the analysis of Callister in Naylor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d 
707, 709-10 (Utah 1985), where it held that the trial court had the power to modify the alimony 
provision of the decree by increasing the amount and extending the duration of payments even 
though the parties had stipulated to $500.00 alimony for five years. 
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The confusion between contract theory and equity seems to arise from the case of Kinsman v. 
Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Kinsman, the Utah Court of Appeals relied on 
contract theory to modify the alimony provision of a divorce decree where the parties stipulated that 
"neither party is entitled to alimony and both parties hereby waive the same now and forever." Id at 
211. However, the court's reliance on contract theory is explained by the fact that the court actually 
viewed the case as dealing with a property settlement in addition to alimony. Besides waiving 
alimony, the stipulation in Kinsman required that the defendant husband was to assume certain debts. 
However, nine months after the divorce he filed bankruptcy and those debts were discharged, forcing 
his wife to pay them off. The plaintiff then filed a motion to modify the decree to award alimony, 
which the district court granted. In affirming the award of alimony, the Court of Appeals stated that 
"[ajffirmance is based on a contract theory." Id at 212. The court viewed the promise to pay off 
the debts, as part of the property settlement, as a condition precedent to the waiver of alimony. 
Because the defendant failed to perform his obligation to pay off the debts, the plaintiff was relieved 
of her obligation to waive alimony. The court stated, "[w]e decline to hold that a change of 
circumstances can overcome a knowing and specific waiver in a stipulation." Id 
The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between equity governing alimony and contract 
theory governing property settlement in Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 527 (Utah 1981), where 
the court stated: 
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between those cases involving the 
statutory power of a court in a divorce proceeding to enter orders concerning support 
and those cases in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their property 
rights by agreement, the terms of which are incorporated in a decree. 
The court explained that equity must recognize a property settlement agreement and cannot reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain 
made. Id (quoting Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1980)). The law limits the 
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continuing jurisdiction of the court when a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into 
the decree. IcL However, the court continued, "[i]n this matter, we deal with child support which is 
always open to the court's power of modification (even though set by stipulation), upon a proper 
showing of a change in circumstances." Id. at 529. 
Further explaining the difference between stipulations regarding property settlement and 
those regarding equitable matters such as alimony or child custody, the Utah Court of Appeals 
explained in Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a child custody case, that 
"Despain and Kinsman apply a contract theory to property distribution issues. Such a theory is 
inapplicable to issues which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court, as here." As a 
result, the court found that the trial court was not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding 
custody. Id. 
Therefore, while a court may be bound by a stipulation regarding property settlement, this 
Court is not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony because Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
5(7)(g)(i) gives the Court continuing equitable jurisdiction to modify alimony. Therefore, the Court 
is not bound by the parties' stipulation and must apply the statutory standard which requires a party 
to show "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." 
II 
The Respondent presented the following evidence in support of her claim that there had been 
a substantial material change in circumstances: 
1) That as part of the property settlement agreement she received stock for her 
interest in Collision Safety Engineering, a company her husband started, and that parts 
of the original company have been sold off. 
2) That after the divorce she opened na art gallery but the gallery failed shortly 
thereafter. 
3) That she did not develop a significant ability to earn income during the marriage. 
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4) That she thought she could support herself with the proceeds from the art gallery 
and the property she received in the divorce settlement, but now these proceeds are 
insufficient. 
5) That the Petitioner has not retired and is earning substantially the same income that 
he earned at the time of the divorce. 
The Court finds that none of these situations constitute a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, as required by the statute. Furthermore, the 
Court finds that none of these situations even rises to the level of a substantial material change in 
circumstances. Therefore, Respondent's Petition fails even under the standard to which the parties' 
stipulated in their Decree. 
The Respondent contends that the facts of the Navlor case are substantially similar to the 
instant case and that it should therefore control. In Navlor, the court increased and extended 
alimony based on the fact that the petitioner's income had more than doubled since the time of the 
divorce while the respondent's income had remained approximately the same, although the parties' 
expected that her income would increase because of her hairdressing business. 700 P.2d at 710. The 
court stated that "[t]he fact that this expectation, which was a predicate for the original support 
order, has not been fulfilled constitutes a material change in circumstances." Id The court also 
observed that Mrs. Naylor agreed to a limited term of alimony because she anticipated that she 
would make enough to support herself through her hairdressing business. Id 
However, Navlor is inapposite because in that case the original alimony award was predicated 
upon the success or failure of the respondent's hairdressing business; whereas, in the instant case, the 
alimony award was not predicated upon the success or failure of Respondent's art gallery. It does 
not appear that alimony was intended to simply supplement Mrs. Warner's income until her art 
gallery became successful. Rather, Mrs. Warner received $7,917.00 a month for almost eleven years, 
totaling more than one million dollars. Furthermore, Mrs. Warner's own actions show that the 
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alimony award was not conditioned on the success or failure of her art gallery. She opened the 
gallery shortly after the divorce and it failed within a year, yet she continued to live on the same 
amount of alimony and did not file her petition to modify alimony until ten years later. In contrast to 
Naylor, the limited term of alimony in the Warner's Decree was not premised on the parties' 
expectation that the Respondent's business would be successful. Therefore, the failure of the art 
gallery does not constitute a substantial material change in circumstances. 
Because Respondent has not met her burden under the statute to show a substantial material 
change in circumstances, she is not entitled to a modification of the original alimony award. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Respondent's Petition to Continue Alimony is DENIED, 
2. Counsel for Petitioner shall prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
DATED this ^ h day of October, 1999. 
Ruling Page 6 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid thereon this day of October, 1999, to the following: 
David S. Dolowitz 
CHONE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC. 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Harold G. Christensen 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
n 
